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In the field of virtual reality (VR), many efforts have been made to analyze presence, the sense of being
in the virtual world. However, it is only recently that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
has been used to study presence during an automatic navigation through a virtual environment. In the
present work, our aim was to use fMRI to study the sense of presence during a VR-free navigation
task, in comparison with visualization of photographs and videos (automatic navigations through
the same environment). The main goal was to analyze the usefulness of fMRI for this purpose,
evaluating whether, in this context, the interaction between the subject and the environment is
performed naturally, hiding the role of technology in the experience. We monitored 14 right-handed
healthy females aged between 19 and 25 years. Frontal, parietal and occipital regions showed their
involvement during free virtual navigation. Moreover, activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
was also shown to be negatively correlated to sense of presence and the postcentral parietal cortex
and insula showed a parametric increased activation according to the condition-related sense of
presence, which suggests that stimulus attention and self-awareness processes related to the insula
may be linked to the sense of presence.
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
• We analyzed the sense of presence experienced in a virtual environment using fMRI.
• Free navigation in a virtual environment was compared with video and photographs.
• The main presence results obtained for the comparison between navigation and video.
• Cuneus, post-central parietal lobe and insula were the principal activated areas.
• Negative correlation with questionnaires found in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Virtual reality (VR) is a technology that has been widely
used to simulate reality. One of the most important concepts
of measuring in VR applications is presence. Presence can
be defined as the sense of being there, inside the virtual
environment (VE), although your body is physically located
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elsewhere (Baños et al., 2000; Sadowski and Stanney, 2002;
Sheridan, 1992; Slater and Wilbur, 1997). In our research,
we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
evaluate brain activation associated with sense of presence
during navigation in a VE, which, as far as we know, is a method
that has not yet been applied for this purpose.
The measure of presence has a major role in the study of
the human–computer interaction (HCI), in order to improve the
design ofVEs and to measure the effect that those improvements
have over the subject. If the subject’s sense of presence
increases inside the VR, it means that the interaction between
the computer-generated world and the subject has improved.
According to Riva et al. (2003), ‘as media becomes increasingly
interactive, perceptually realistic and immersive, the experience
of presence becomes more realistic’. Moreover, as Sjölie et al.
(2010) remarked, measuring the brain activity while interacting
naturally with the system allows for correlating the activity in
specific brain areas with hidden cognitive states, which can be
related to aspects of the interface and the interaction. The final
aim in HCI is to develop systems ‘that minimize the barrier
between the human’s cognitive model of what users want to
accomplish and the computer’s understanding of the users’ task’
(Sharp et al., 2007). If we can disclose the neural correlates
that hide behind the sense of presence, maybe we will be able
to develop adaptive brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) which
allow the environment to change depending on the user’s needs.
This will help one to accomplish a satisfying experience for the
user, making the VEs disappear from the subject’s awareness
(disappearance of mediation; Riva et al., 2003).
Although presence is inherent to exposure to VEs, most
previous studies that combined VR with fMRI did not evaluate
this concept or its influence on the virtual experience. The
first studies in this area aimed to demonstrate the value of
combining both techniques and the different possibilities that
this association could offer (e.g., Baumann et al., 2003; Mraz
et al., 2003). Other studies have analyzed brain activation
associated with the performance of specific navigation tasks
in controlled VEs. For example, Astur et al. (2005) analyzed
spatial memory during navigation in a virtual radial arm maze
and reported changes in bilateral hippocampus activation. Pine
et al. (2002) conducted a study of the neuronal correlates of
different spatial navigation conditions using VEs as stimuli.
They found that navigation ability correlated with activation
in different regions, including the right-frontal and right-
anterior medial temporal lobe. Hartley et al. (2003) also used
fMRI to compare brain activations between two experimental
conditions: wayfinding and route following. They obtained
between-subjects correlation of activation with performance
in the anterior hippocampus for the former condition, and
in the head of caudate for the latter. In another study,
Mellet et al. (2010) compared brain activations while mentally
estimating the distances between landmarks placed in a
learned environment. One group of subjects performed the
learning during a real walking task and the other in an
equivalent virtual walking task of the same environment.
They found a left-lateralization of the brain activations
in the virtual learners, compared with the real learners.
In another study, Sjölie et al. (2010) analyzed the brain
activations due to a mental rotation task. Although they did not
measure presence, two other important VR parameters were
analyzed: 3D-motion and interactivity. For this purpose, they
compared between three experimental conditions: one without
motion (still), one with automatic non-interactive motion
(auto) and the last one with interactively controlled motion
(interactive). They found that the addition of interactivity
increased the activation of the main areas of the mental
rotation network, including frontal and preparatory motor
areas.
Turning now to presence, several authors have theorized
about the concept and its implications (e.g., Kim and Biocca,
2006; Lombard and Ditton, 2006; Schuemie et al., 2001). Inside
a VE, presence refers to the sense of being in it instead of
being in the real room where the experience is taking place.
According to Heeter (1992), in the natural world, this process is
engaged since birth; while in the VE this derives from feeling as
if you existed as a separate form within a virtual world that also
existed. Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005) also pointed out that
inside the virtual experience, you are at the same time conscious
of the ‘place’ and the ‘events’ and simultaneously conscious
of that there are no such place of events; however, you still
behave and think as if the place were real and the events were
happening. As your consciousness of the differences between
the real and virtual place and events blurs, the barrier between
your mind and the VE diminishes, improving your interaction
with the computer-generated world. And that is because, as
Loomis (1992) remarked, ‘presence is a fundamental property
of consciousness’. Therefore, it is unlikely to be unidimensional
(Kim and Biocca, 2006). The International Society for Presence
Research (2000) proposed that presence could be considered
from several major dimensions, based on the findings of
different studies in the matter. The first dimension is spatial
presence, the subjects’ belief that they are really inside the VE.
The second is sensory presence, which is related to the subjects’
perception of the VE as they would perceive the real world,
divided into visual, auditory and tactile perception. Social
realism refers to the subjects’ perception that objects, events
and people that appear in the VE could exist in the real
world. Engagement occurs when the subject feels the VE to
be involving. Finally, social presence refers to communication
with other people or entities inside the VE.
However, many theories about what is presence have been
formulated. For example, presence has been defined as the
faculty of being-in-the-world (Flach and Holden, 1998; Zahorik
and Jenison, 1998). In this assumption, presence is described
as the ‘successfully supported action in the environment’.
As Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005) explained, following this
theory, presence would not only be the sense of ‘being there’,
but also the ability to ‘do’ there. In this line of argument, the
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Correlates of Presence during Virtual Reality 271
possibility of movement through the environment by the subject
would increase his sense of presence.
Regarding measurement techniques for presence, traditional
methods are questionnaire-based (e.g., Baños et al., 2000;
Lessiter et al., 2001; Usoh et al., 2000; Witmer and Singer,
1998). To avoid the problems inherent to subjective measures,
objective techniques have also been proposed, mainly based on
psychophysiological measures. For example, as skin conductiv-
ity and heart rate can be related to the anxiety level of the users,
they could constitute an indicator of the presence that the user is
feeling in environments that generate these kinds of responses
(Dillon et al., 2000; Meehan et al., 2001). Furthermore, recent
studies have analyzed presence from a neuroscience point of
view, and it has been stated that VR is not only a tool for neu-
roscience, but that presence in VEs is also an object of study
for neuroscientists (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
We can also remark some studies which focused on the con-
cept of presence using other brain activation related techniques,
such as transcranial Doppler (TCD) or electroencephalography
(EEG). Two recent studies (Alcañiz et al., 2009; Rey et al.,
2010) proposed that TCD could be used as a brain activity mea-
surement technique to study presence in VEs. Results of these
two studies showed changes in blood flow velocity in the major
cerebral arteries of the participants during moments associated
with different levels of presence in different immersive and nav-
igational conditions. With regard to EEG, we can emphasize the
work developed by Baumgartner et al. (2006), which compared
activation in children and adolescents while watching a video
of a virtual roller coaster and concluded that it evoked activa-
tions in parietal brain areas. Furthermore, the children reported a
higher spatial presence experience than the adolescents (showed
by a lower activation in the frontal brain).
However, as already indicated, there are no fMRI studies
that have analyzed brain activation associated with presence
during a free navigation in a VE. The advantages that fMRI
provides compared to other image techniques are based on its
better spatial resolution together with a decent temporal one, the
fact that it is not invasive and that does not use ionizing radiation
(unlike other image techniques such as computed yomography
or X-rays), not provoking secondary effects on the subject.
The spatial resolution of the technique is suitable to observe
specific brain areas and neural networks that are activated
during the presence experience, which may not be possible
with other techniques. As far as we know, the only previous
related study was conducted by Baumgartner et al. (2008),
which applied fMRI to analyze brain activation associated with
presence in VR. However, they did not use VEs in which
the participants could navigate freely. They compared brain
activation in children and adults while the subjects watched
a VR video of an automatic navigation, with the same roller
coaster scenario used in the previous EEG study (Baumgartner
et al., 2006), to identify which areas of the brain were activated
with the experience of presence and to identify differences
between the age groups due to brain maturity. They compared
the differences between a high presence and a low presence
environment. Results from the fMRI analysis showed that the
presence experience evoked by the virtual roller coaster scenario
was associated with an increase in activation in a distributed
network. A preliminary neuroanatomical model of presence
can be extracted from these results. As discussed later by
Jäncke et al. (2009), the distributed network that is activated
during the presence experience includes the dorsal and ventral
visual stream, the parietal cortex, the premotor cortex, the
mesial temporal areas (including the hippocampus, amygdala
and insula), the brainstem and the thalamus. Baumgartner et al.
(2008) explained the activation of the parietal lobe based on the
definition of presence as ‘an egocentric spatial experience of
VEs’. The parietal lobe is believed to be activated as a result
of its role in ‘generating an egocentric view by translation
of the retinal coordinates to head-centered coordinates’. They
also concluded that there are some brain areas, such as the
prefrontal cortex, that continue maturing throughout life and
may be associated with ‘the modulation of the inter-individual
differences in the experience of presence’. The more intense
the sense of presence, the smaller was the activation in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Jäncke et al., 2009).
They also remarked the activation of the insula as part of
the distributed network that generates presence. The insula
is considered to participate in the sense of self-awareness
and body-ownership, which leads to the formation of your
‘body schema’. This means that if this area is activated in
the participants of a presence-inducing task, their feeling of
embodiment inside the VE will have increased during the
experience, making the barrier between the virtual and the real
body disappears. This will contribute to an improvement in the
participants’ interaction with the VE. This concept is important
when considering HCI applications of presence.
In the present study, the main goal was to analyze if brain
imaging techniques can be used to evaluate the sense of
presence stimulated while the subject interacts with a computer-
generated environment. For this purpose, we looked for the brain
areas that were activated in relation to the sense of presence
during a VR paradigm. However, the most relevant objective of
the present work is not only to map the brain areas related to
presence, but also to study if the sense of presence itself can
be stimulated and measured using fMRI. If this can be proved,
it will mean that the interaction between the environment and
the subject is performed naturally, and that the technology has
become ‘invisible’ to the subject. In a previous publication, the
questionnaire results of this work were presented in comparison
with other brain imaging techniques (Clemente et al., 2011),
now we want to complete those questionnaire results with
those obtained from the fMRI data. Once the importance of the
concept of presence inside the HCI theory is understood, fMRI
can be seen as the tool to analyze the existence of the sense of
presence in a more objective way than the use of questionnaires.
What is more, fMRI allows the continuous measure of slow
variations in the sense of presence in time, so it will allow us to
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have a complete report of the HCI along time; thing that cannot
be accomplished with the traditional measurement tools. This
can work as a steady feedback of the efficiency of the VR world.
We know from previous studies that the sense of presence is
influenced by the possibility of self-controlling the navigation
(Alcañiz et al., 2009; Welch et al., 1996). In order to analyze
the brain activation associated to changes in the level of
presence, different navigation paradigms will be compared
in our experimental design. Specifically, we will compare
brain activation during an experimental condition where
the participants could navigate freely, with less immersive
configurations (visualization of still images of the environment,
and visualization of an automatic navigation—video—through
the same environment). The selection of the three experimental
conditions has been made based on the definition of
Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005) of the concept of presence as
the ability to ‘do’ inside the VR, so the more you do inside the
VE, the more presence you will feel. Comparing the conditions
of free and guided navigation (video), we expect to measure
the differences in the level of presence due to the self-control
of the movement; while the still-photographs condition will act
as baseline condition. From this point of view, the increase of
activity between the three experimental conditions would be
translated to an increase in the sense of presence, losing the
consciousness of the existing barrier between the real and
the virtual world. In order to ensure that there were differences
in the level of presence between the different experimental
conditions, the sense of ‘being there’ was evaluated by means
of a validated questionnaire (Usoh et al., 2000), which has
been applied to obtain a subjective measure of the spatial
dimension of presence in the different conditions and subjects.
The main hypothesis of our research was that brain activation
would be higher during a navigation task than during a video
or photograph task in areas such as the cuneus and the parietal
lobe, which we know are related to presence from previous
studies. Taking into account the results of Baumgartner et al.
(2008), we also expected to find negative correlations between
the activation in the DLPFC and self-reported presence scores.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Subjects
For this study, we recruited 14 right-handed women, none
of them with any medical or psychological disorders, aged
between 19 and 25 (mean age 21.64). The participants’
hand dominance was tested using the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). These women were students, were
paid for their participation in the study and were recruited
from the Universitat Jaume I in Castellón and the Universitat
Politècnica de València.
Ethical approval was obtained from the authors’ institution,
and each subject signed a written informed consent prior to
participation.
2.2. Environments
The VEs were programmed using GameStudio software
(Conitec Datensysteme GmbH, Germany), which allowed us
to develop 3D objects and virtual worlds with which we could
interact and navigate. Our VE consisted of an everyday, clean
bedroom (with a bed, a closet, and a desk with some books on
it) where participants could navigate freely.
To allow us to identify the specific areas of the brain that
were activated for each task, we divided the paradigm into three
conditions developed with the same VE: in the first, only pho-
tographs of the room could be visualized (four photographs dis-
played for 4.5 s each with 0.5 s of black screen between them); in
the second, a video of an automatic navigation through the same
room could be observed (with a duration of 20 s); and in the last
one, the participant could navigate freely for 20 s in the VE.
In order to prevent the subjects from staying still during the
navigation period, they were instructed to perform a search task
which forced them to move through the environment and kept
them engaged with the stimuli. This task consisted in searching
for some red keys that randomly appeared and disappeared in
the environment, and counting the number of them that they
had seen (maximum of 4, remaining in the VE for 5 s). They
were not encouraged to find them all, or to find them as quickly
as possible, they were only told to continue searching for them
during each period. To prevent differences between the different
phases of the experiment, this counting task was also performed
during the other two conditions. During the photograph period,
some of the images showed featured keys and some did not,
and the subjects had to count the number of keys they saw.
During the video task, the keys appeared randomly in the
environment as the camera moved through it. After each task,
subjects were questioned about the number of keys they had
found (they had to answer in a short period of 4 s). While they
were conducting the tasks, the researcher checked that they
had answered properly. The number of keys counted is not
relevant, it was just included to avoid the subjects to remain still
during the experimental conditions. Between phases, a black
screen appeared to give subjects a rest period during which
brain activation could decay to its baseline values (6 s) before
the label indicating the next task appeared (2 s). The total time
between tasks was 12 s. At the beginning of the experiment
there were 14 s of black screen to compensate for T1 saturation
effects. Each of the three experimental conditions was repeated
six times in a counterbalanced order to prevent effects produced
by the order in which they were presented. The total time of the
complete experiment was 12 min 52 s. A scheme of the protocol
can be seen in Figure 1.
To learn about the tasks that had to be performed inside the
scanner room, subjects underwent a prior training session where
they were introduced to the VR navigation and to the tasks.
They were also shown the differences between the photographs,
videos and navigation, and practiced the hand movement using
the joystick as it was going to be done during the scanner session.
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FIGURE 1. Diagram of the experimental design.
This training session was conducted in a supplementary VE to
prevent habituation. In order to prevent differences in activation
caused by the motor task, subjects were instructed to move the
joystick continuously during the video and photograph tasks
in the same way as they did during the navigation period.
The joystick movement was made just to compensate the
brain activations caused by motor tasks between the different
conditions. During the fMRI scan, the VR application checked
the total time that they spent moving the joystick in each
condition to guarantee that the motor movements had been
continuous in all the cases.
2.3. Post-fMRI questionnaires
After the scanner session, subjects had to answer the questions
in the Slater, Usoh and Steed (SUS) questionnaire (Usoh et al.,
2000) to evaluate the level of presence that they felt during each
task. The questionnaire consisted in six, 7-point Likert-type,
questions that had to be answered depending on the strength of
the ‘being there’ sensation experienced, where 1 corresponded
to not feeling there at all and 7 to the highest sense of being there
(as experienced in the real world). A midscale value of 4 would
correspond to an intermediate level of being there, experienced
by the subject as the midpoint between the feeling in the real
world and not feeling there at all. Subjects had to complete
three questionnaires, one for each task, all containing the same
questions.
2.4. fMRI procedures
All subjects were scanned in a 1.5 T Siemens Avanto Magnetic
Resonance scanning device (General Hospital, Castellón,
Spain). We used an adapted magnetic resonance (MR) helmet to
prevent head movement. To display the environments, we used
MRI-compatible video goggles, VisualStim Digital (Resonance
Technology Inc., Los Angeles, USA); and, for the navigation,
we used an adapted joystick (Resonance Technology Inc.,
Los Angeles, USA). First, as is indicated for fMRI studies
(Amaro and Barker, 2006), we acquired the sagittal T1-weighted
structural images of the brain (224 × 256 matrix covering the
brain with 176 contiguous 1 mm slices, repetition time (TR) =
11 ms, echo time (TE) = 4.94 ms, flip angle (FA) = 15◦, voxel
size = 1.04 × 1.04 mm). Then the functional scanning was
launched, synchronized with the VEs. Functional images were
obtained using a T2∗ single-shot echo-planar imaging sequence.
We used 30 contiguous 4.2 mm interleaved axial slices (parallel
to the line between the anterior commissure (AC) and the
posterior commissure (PC) or the AC–PC line) covering the
entire volume of the brain with a 64×64 matrix (TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, FA = 90◦, voxel size = 3.5 × 3.5 mm).
2.5. Data analysis
2.5.1. Questionnaire analysis
We analyzed the results of the SUS questionnaires using the
program SPSS 17.0 (IBM Corporation, Somers, NY, USA).
Apart from the individual responses to the six questions
associated with each of the periods (photographs, video and
navigation), we calculated an additional measurement: SUS
mean. This is the mean score across the six questions that have
already been described in previous studies (Usoh et al., 2000).
We carried out a non-parametric Friedman Test to compare SUS
responses (dependent variables: questions 1–6 and the SUS
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mean) for the different experimental conditions: photographs,
video and navigation. Post hoc tests were made with a Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test with Bonferroni correction.
2.5.2. fMRI analysis
To analyze the fMRI data we used Statistical Parametric
Mapping software (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, UK), launched with Matlab Version 7.1
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). The first seven scans were
excluded from the analysis to eliminate the decay of the fMRI
signal associated with the moment when magnetization reaches
equilibrium. The first step was to align the images to the AC–
PC line. Then we began the preprocess (Friston et al., 1995)
realigning the functional images (estimate and reslice option),
coregistering them to the structural images and segmenting this
latter anatomical scan to obtain the gray matter, white matter
and cerebrospinal fluid images. We then normalized the resliced
functional volumes with the normalization parameters extracted
after segmentation and normalization of the anatomical volumes
for each subject separately (template provided by the Montreal
Neurological Institute [MNI]). We did not have to exclude any
volunteer due to movements or distortions during the fMRI.
Finally, we smoothed the images using a Gaussian kernel (full-
width at half-maximum of 8 × 8 × 8 mm).
In a first fixed-effect level analysis (with the aim of detecting
changes in the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal
between conditions in a single subject), the individual contrasts
comparing between the different experimental conditions are
obtained. In this analysis, the functional time series for
each subject and for each condition were modeled with a
box-car function convolved with the hemodynamic response
function. As a result, the ‘navigation > video’, ‘navigation >
photographs’ and ‘video > photographs’ contrasts for
each subject were obtained. The parameters for the motion
correction were employed as regressors of non-interest. We
also applied a 128 s high-pass filter to eliminate the low-
frequency components in the signal caused by scanner motion
and warming.
Group tests were performed at second level random effect
analysis, where the group of subjects is taken into account.
Taking into account the results obtained in previous similar
studies (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Pine et al., 2002), we tested
for task-related activation by performing a one-sample t-test
including contrast images of estimated parameters from all the
subjects for the differences of interest between conditions. In
total, we performed three one-sample t-test, for the contrasts
‘navigation > video’, ‘navigation > photographs’ and
‘video > photographs’.
Once we obtained the brain activation maps for each group-
level contrast, we conducted a second-level multiple regression
analysis to evaluate the existent relationship between brain
activation in the aforementioned contrasts (‘navigation >
video’, ‘navigation > photographs’and ‘video > photographs’)
and the subjective scores from the questionnaires.We performed
three new group-level analysis (for the three contrasts of
interest), where we used as covariate the differences between the
SUS mean results for the experimental conditions compared in
the contrast (see Baumgartner et al., 2008). The covariate then
is a vector of 14 components, one for each subject. The value
of the component of each subject is obtained by subtracting
the value of the SUS mean for the second condition of the
contrast compared from the value of the SUS mean of the
first condition of the contrast. For example, our main interest
lay in the ‘navigation > video’ contrast, where we obtained
the correlation analysis between the ‘navigation > video’
contrast and the responses from the SUS questionnaires for the
‘navigation SUS mean score—video SUS mean score’.
Finally, we studied the brain areas that showed a linear
parametric modulation of the activation levels and their
associated subjective level of presence (SUS mean of
each condition minus the global SUS mean) for the three
experimental conditions (navigation, videos and photographs),
according to increased sense of presence (following a procedure
described in previous studies, such as Geake and Hansen, 2005;
Scheibe et al., 2006; Smith, 2004).
Results from statistical tests at group level were considered
significant if 10 or more adjacent voxels passed the statistical
threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected). To obtain the specific
brain areas that are activated in each contrast, we used the
xjView (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview8/) software utility for
SPM that uses the MNI coordinates system.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Questionnaire results
The answers to the SUS questionnaire, given after fMRI
monitoring during exposure to the different experimental
conditions, showed the between-subject variations. As sense
of presence is subjective, each person can experience the
conditions with a different grade of affectation. Mean values
in each condition are shown in Table 1.
Results from applying the non-parametric Friedman Test
showed that there were significant differences between the three
experimental conditions for all the questions except question 5
(results can be observed in Table 1, columns 5 and 6), including
the SUS mean value. If we observe the results for each question,
we can see that the greatest Chi-square value (χ2 = 16,
p < 0.001) is observed for question 1.
Post hoc analyses based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were
conducted on the SUS mean results with Bonferroni correction,
resulting in a significance level set at p < 0.0167. There were
no significant differences between the photograph and the video
tasks (Z = 1.174, p = 0.241 > 0.0167). However, there
was a statistically significant increment in the SUS mean in
the navigation versus photographs (Z = 2.805, p = 0.005 <
0.0167) and the navigation versus video comparisons (Z =
2.550, p = 0.011 < 0.0167).
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TABLE 1. SUS responses to the questionnaires for each task and results of the Friedman test for each question (7-point Likert scale) and the
mean score
Photographs Video Navigation χ2 P
SUS question 1: feeling of ‘being there’ 3.14 ± 0.39 3.79 ± 0.45 4.43 ± 0.43 16.00 <0.001
SUS question 2: feeling that the room is real 2.79 ± 0.48 3.14 ± 0.48 3.50 ± 0.50 6.75 0.034
SUS question 3: how real do you remember the room? 2.00 ± 0.31 2.50 ± 0.42 3.14 ± 0.49 10.90 0.004
SUS question 4: feeling of being inside the room or observing it 3.14 ± 0.38 3.14 ± 0.49 4.07 ± 0.45 6.45 0.004
SUS question 5: memory of the room as similar to being in other places 3.43 ± 0.44 3.50 ± 0.42 4.00 ± 0.46 5.25 0.072
SUS question 6: did you think you were really in the room? 2.71 ± 0.37 3.00 ± 0.50 3.50 ± 0.53 6.07 0.048
SUS mean 2.87 ± 0.33 3.18 ± 0.40 3.77 ± 0.43 12.29 0.002
Note. The mean score and standard error of the mean for the 14 subjects are presented in each cell.
TABLE 2. Brain area activation results for the ‘navigation > video’, ‘navigation > photographs’ and ‘video > photographs’ contrasts
Anatomical region H x (mm) y (mm) z (mm) t score Cluster size
Postcentral/Parietal Lobe L −47 −18 59 5.7771 19
Insula R 34 0 17 5.4986 10
Navigation > Video Cuneus/Occipital Lobe R 10 −91 26 5.3162 10
Extra-nuclear/Sub-lobar R 27 −42 13 5.2809 16
Calcarine/Middle Occipital gyrus/Occipital Lobe R 24 −98 0 5.0042 22
Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L −43 −49 −37 5.0356 56
Cerebellum Posterior Lobe L −8 −74 −25 5.8061 17
Navigation > Photographs Superior and Middle Occipital Lobe/Cuneus L −22 −84 21 10.919 1085
Lingual/Occipital Lobe R 3 −70 5 6.7976 83
Superior Frontal Lobe R 24 0 55 9.8225 143
Inferior Temporal Lobe/BA37 R 48 −70 −4 9.57 1147
Lingual Gyrus/Inter-Hemispheric R 3 −74 0 5.28 38
Video > Photographs Inferior Frontal Operculum/Sub-Gyral/Frontal Lobe R 41 11 21 5.99 44
Supramarginal Gyrus/Inferior Parietal Lobe R 55 −39 30 4.83 13
Middle Frontal Gyrus/Frontal Lobe R 27 0 51 5.91 73
Middle Frontal Gyrus/Frontal Lobe L −29 4 51 4.22 10
Note: H column refers to the hemisphere of each activation.
3.2. Imaging results
3.2.1. Contrasts results
Our fMRI paradigm was divided into three different tasks
(photographs, videos and navigation) that we wanted to compare
to obtain the contrasting brain activations. We obtained results
for the three contrasts between tasks, the most relevant for the
purposes of our study being those concerning the differences in
activation between the free navigation and the guided navigation
(video). Therefore, we selected the contrast ‘navigation >
video’ and looked for the main activated brain regions. We
found activations in the right cuneus and left parietal lobe among
others (see the upper part of Table 2 and Figure 2). Other brain
regions activated in the ‘navigation > video’ contrast were the
right calcarine, right sub-lobar and right insula.
Regarding the ‘navigation > photographs’ contrast, new
activations were seen in the left cerebellum, both in the anterior
and posterior lobes, and in the superior frontal lobe. There
were activations in some areas of the occipital lobe, such as
the cuneus, the left and right middle occipital lobe, and the
right lingual gyrus. Finally, we also found activations in areas
of the parietal lobe, such as the precuneus (see the middle part
of Table 2 and Figure 3).
For the ‘video > photographs’contrast, we found activations
in the right inferior temporal lobe, the right lingual gyrus, the
right inferior frontal lobe, the right supramarginal gyrus and
the right and left middle frontal lobe (see the inferior part of
Table 2 and Figure 4). It is important to mention here that with
the inverse contrasts (‘video > navigation’, ‘photographs >
navigation’ and ‘photographs > video’), we did not obtain any
significant activation results.
3.2.2. Positive and negative correlation results
We conducted a second-level multiple regression analysis for
our contrast of interest ‘navigation > video’, from which we
obtained correlations between the fMRI results and the SUS
mean values obtained from the questionnaires. On the one
hand, for the ‘navigation > video’ contrast, results showed a
negative correlation (Table 3) between the questionnaire results
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FIGURE 2. Main brain activation results for the ‘navigation > video’ contrast, centered in the right cuneus. Results are shown in neurological
coordinates. The bar represents statistical t-values.
and the activation observed in the DLPFC of the right frontal
lobe, which can be seen in Figure 5. On the other hand, a
positive correlation was found between the responses to the
questionnaires and activation in the left lingual gyrus, left
cerebellum anterior lobe, left middle inferior temporal lobe,
left sub-gyral, left calcarine, left superior temporal lobe, left
middle temporal gyrus and left cuneus. All these results can
be seen in Table 3. Moreover, the graph showing the positive
correlation for the lingual gyrus (the most remarkable of the
positive correlation results) is shown in Figure 6.
3.2.3. Parametric analysis results
Finally, we tested for the possible existence of an increasing
linear trend in the activation corresponding to the three reported
levels of presence (SUS mean of each condition minus the global
SUS mean values) according to the experimental conditions.
The results showed that an increasing linear trend for the
different presence-related conditions (photographs, videos and
navigation) was observed in the activations in the right insula
(x = 41, y = −14, z = 13; t = 4.22, p < 0.001, 10 cluster
size) and the left postcentral parietal gyrus (x = −47, y = −18,
z = 59, t = 6.67, p < 0.001, 10 cluster size) for the three
experimental conditions (see Figure 7).
4. DISCUSSION
The principal aim of our study was to analyze whether subjects
could feel presence while navigating in a VE, analyzing the
results using fMRI. As mentioned in Section 1, if this is so,
this would mean that the interaction between the computer-
generated world and the subject is naturally performed and
the barrier between technology and reality has been reduced;
which is a major interest in HCI. As mentioned previously, we
tried to generate an increase in the sense of presence between
the different experimental conditions by means of the increase
in the actions the user has to perform in the VE. Presence
was then especially motivated by the free navigation condition,
where it is the user who controls the movement along the
environment. This free navigation in a VE was shown to induce
a higher feeling of presence in the participants than a guided
navigation condition (that in a comparison would act as the
low presence condition). Contrasting the functional activation
seen during these two conditions (‘navigation > video’),
results showed a higher activation of the parietal and occipital
brain regions, including the cuneus, during the navigation
condition, as hypothesized, but also activation of the right insula.
These areas are included in the distributed network activated
by presence that was described in Section 1 of this paper.
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FIGURE 3. Main brain activation results for the ‘navigation > photographs’ contrast, centered in the left superior occipital lobe. Results are
shown in neurological coordinates. The bar represents statistical t-values.
Moreover, the differential subjective sense of presence reported
by participants in the questionnaires between the navigation
and video conditions was shown to be inversely correlated to
the activation of the DLPFC, and directly correlated to the
activation of the lingual gyrus and cuneus and other occipital and
temporal regions. Finally, we observed a linear increase in the
activation of the right insula and left postcentral parietal regions
according to the subjective sense of presence reported for each
condition (SUS mean of each condition minus the global SUS
mean values). Among the multiple brain areas activated by the
‘navigation > video’ contrast, we can highlight the cuneus
and the post-central parietal lobe, which have been related to
working memory and navigation tasks (Haldane et al., 2008;
Mishkin and Ungerleider, 1982). These results are comparable
to those obtained in other presence studies that have been
conducted using fMRI (Baumgartner et al., 2008) or can be
extrapolated to the results obtained with other techniques such
as TCD (Alcañiz et al., 2009) or EEG (Baumgartner et al.,
2006), always considering the limited spatial resolution of these
techniques. Regarding the ‘navigation > photographs’ and
‘video > photographs’ contrasts, they showed some similar
activations, such as the lingual gyrus, the cuneus, the frontal
lobe or the occipital lobe. In this section, we will discuss all
these items in more detail.
The subjects answered three SUS questionnaires (one for
each experimental condition) where they evaluated the level of
presence they felt. In each question, they value between 1 (not
feeling there at all) and 7 (highest sense of ‘being there’) the
presence experience. The results confirmed that a higher level
of presence was induced during the free navigation than during
the photograph and guided navigation conditions. Furthermore,
we can observe how the mean value for subjective sense of
presence increased for each condition, observing the lowest
score for the photographs and the highest score for navigation.
Specifically, the Friedman Test showed significant differences
between the experimental conditions for all the questions and
the SUS mean except for question 5, which evaluated how
the user remembered the experience in comparison to a real
one. The largest difference between experimental conditions
in response to the questionnaire was found in Question 1,
which asked directly about the sense of being in the virtual
world. Finally, post hoc analysis based on the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests showed no significant differences in the
comparison of the photograph and the video tasks, but that
there were significant differences for the other two comparisons:
photographs versus navigation and video versus navigation.
Therefore, as hypothesized, there were significant differences
between the level of presence experienced during the navigation
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FIGURE 4. Main brain activation results for the ‘video > photographs’ contrast, centered in the right inferior temporal lobe. Results are shown
in neurological coordinates. The bar represents statistical t-values.
TABLE 3. Brain areas showing negative and positive correlations between activation in the ‘navigation > video’ contrast and averaged
questionnaire results.
Anatomical region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t score Cluster size Correlation
Frontal Lobe R 45 21 17 4.8747 21 Negative
Lingual/Parahippocampal Gyrus/Limbic Lobe L −19 −53 0 6.1862 114 Positive
Temporal_Mid/Inferior Temporal Gyrus/Temporal Lobe L −61 −14 −21 5.9193 25 Positive
Cerebellum_4_5/Culmen/Cerebellum Anterior Lobe L −19 −35 −21 5.763 18 Positive
Cuneus/Precuneus/Parietal Lobe L −12 −74 38 5.7275 23 Positive
Temporal_Sup/Superior Temporal Gyrus/Temporal Lobe L −68 −28 9 5.3975 21 Positive
Sub-Gyral/Temporal Lobe L −36 −11 −12 5.1038 14 Positive
Calcarine/Cuneus/Occipital Lobe L −1 −91 9 5.044 13 Positive
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Temporal Lobe L −29 −74 17 4.6807 10 Positive
condition and that experienced during the other two conditions.
As indicated, a previous study by Welch et al. (1996) analyzed
this connection between presence and navigation and their
results are in accordance with the present study. They used
two levels of interaction, the subject as an active or a passive
driver, and observed that the interactivity increased the sense of
presence the subject experienced.
One purpose of our research was to test the hypothesis
that fMRI is an appropriate way to explore brain activation
related to presence in a VE when comparing between different
experimental conditions, allowing us to obtain objective
differences in brain activation associated with the different
levels of presence that the subjects have experienced. The main
contrast that we analyzed was the ‘navigation > video’contrast,
to evaluate the differences in brain activation between two
conditions that induced different levels of presence, as measured
with the SUS questionnaire. In the following paragraphs, the
results from this principal contrast will be analyzed in detail.
As explained in Section 3, one of the most significant activated
areas is the cuneus, part of the occipital lobe. This area has been
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FIGURE 5. Graph of results for the ‘navigation > video’ contrast, showing the negative correlation between the activation in the DLPFC (contrast
estimates difference) and the questionnaire results (navigation SUS mean - video SUS mean). The bar represents statistical t-values.
FIGURE 6. Graph of results for the ‘navigation > video’ contrast, showing the positive correlation between the activation in the lingual gyrus
(contrast estimates difference) and the questionnaire results (navigation SUS mean - video SUS mean). The bar represents statistical t-values.
related in previous studies to the visual processing (Perani et al.,
2001). The cuneus is known to receive visual information from
the contralateral superior retina, and the processing that occurs
in the area is modulated by other effects, such as attention,
working memory or reward expectation (Haldane et al., 2008;
Vanni et al., 2001). Our study relates cuneus activation to the
subjective sense of presence experienced during free navigation
in a VE. Another region included in the results is the calcarine
sulcus, also part of the occipital lobe where the primary visual
cortex is concentrated (Belliveau et al., 1991; Le Bihan et al.,
1993).
Another brain region that showed significant activation
during the task was the post-central parietal lobe. Between
the usual areas considered to be part of the presence network,
the parietal lobe is involved in determining spatial sense
and navigation, directly associated with the navigation in the
VE (Johnson et al., 1996; Mishkin and Ungerleider, 1982).
Moreover, Mellet et al. (2010) found that left activation of the
parietal lobe was higher while navigating through a VE than
while navigating through a real one. We also found activation
in the insula, usually related to emotion and the regulation of
the body’s homeostasis, including perception, motor control of
hand and eye movements, self-awareness, cognitive functioning
and interpersonal experience (Craig, 2009; Karnath et al., 2005).
As pointed out in Section 1, the most important of these items
for our study are self-awareness, sense of agency and sense
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FIGURE 7. BOLD signal change in response to the different
experimental conditions around MNI coordinates (−46, −18, 59),
corresponding to the left parietal lobe. Observe the increase in signal
between experimental conditions.
of body ownership, because they are closely related to the
sense of presence experienced inside the VE. The sense of
body ownership allows you to discriminate your individual’s
own body and perceptions; forming the ‘body schema’ that
covers the dynamic distributed network of procedures aimed
at guiding your behavior (Haans and Ijsselsteijn, 2012). Our
results showed a parametric increase in the activation of the
right insula according to the sense of presence experience in
the conditions. Recent studies (Dodds et al., 2011) have found
evidence that the right insula may be activated by a combination
of attentional and response control demands, playing a role in
the processing of sensory stimuli that are relevant to current
goals. During navigation in a virtual world, decisions are
constantly made based on evaluation of the sensory stimuli
guiding our behavior in the VE. Our results suggest that the
insula may play a key role in guiding behavior in the VE based
on the presented stimuli and the sense of presence. Moreover,
according to Sjölie (2012), attention and behavior are essential
to develop the sense of presence, increasing the precision in the
predictions about the environment and the synchronization with
it, and avoiding prediction errors from sources outside the VE.
All these results are consistent with those obtained in
the Baumgartner et al. (2008) research. They generated
different levels of presence by means of two different types
of environment, one that induced a high arousal experience
and another that induced a low arousal experience. They
placed particular emphasis on the parietal lobe as one of
the most important areas related to presence and egocentric
spatial processing, something which was also observed in
our results. They also mentioned significant activations in the
cuneus, middle occipital gyrus and areas involved in emotional
processing, such as the insula; activations in these brain regions
were also observed in our study and associated with the
condition which induced the higher level of presence.
Although our results can be compared with those obtained in
previous presence studies, those comparisons should be done
carefully. Each brain area is involved in several other functions
not related with presence, and the network described before is
not a closed one to the study of presence. The activation of
those areas does not necessarily imply stimulation of the sense
of presence. As Jäncke et al. (2009) explained, it is a network
involved in the control of many other psychological functions,
and ‘the psychological specificity cannot be inferred simply
by identifying the activated brain structures’. Moreover, our
primary aim was to demonstrate the validity of fMRI as a tool
to evaluate presence; not to map the brain network involved in its
stimulation. The fMRI is a great tool to measure brain activity,
but the size and characteristics of the machine makes impossible
to use it in real situations. If it can be proved that inside the
fMRI, the subject can feel presence inside a VE; this could lead
to the use of VR to approach the subject to the equivalent real
situation while being scanned. Moreover, as aforementioned,
demonstrating that the sense of presence can be stimulated
proves that the interaction between the computer-generated
environment and the subject is performed naturally, making the
technology ‘invisible’ to the user. Obtaining activation in brain
areas that have been previously related to presence is remarkable
in the sense of showing that our results are not random, and
that our initial hypothesis has been accomplished. The main
objective of our fMRI research is then to bring into agreement
with previous presence theories, not to show new results on the
matter.
In a more theoretical perspective, the degree of presence in a
VE may be considered as the degree of synchronization between
the environment and the subject’s mental reality. In our case,
the subjects view the VE for the first time in their lives during
the scan, but due to the increasing familiarity of humans with
virtual phenomena, this should lead to the internalization of
mental simulations of the VEs, which matches with the activity
theory so popular in the HCI circles (Sjölie, 2012). So, the
fact that the subjects are not familiarized with the environments
should not prevent the sense of presence. Moreover, the central
nervous system is capable of incorporating the new tools and
technological artifacts that we use in the virtual experiences
to its representation of the body schema, integrating them
in a functional unity with our biological limbs and sensory
receptors (Haans and Ijsselsteijn, 2012), helping the interface
transparency or ‘disappearance of mediation’(Riva et al., 2003).
Referring to the search task the subjects had to perform inside
the environment, it was designed to avoid them staying still
during the experiences, but the fact of identifying an objective
to perform inside the virtual world enhances a major sense
of presence in the subjects (Riva et al., 2011). In fact, if the
performer becomes ‘emotionally and intellectually engaged’by
the task developed, higher levels of presence can be achieved
(Waterworth et al., 2002); which leads to a state of loss
of self-consciousness (Riva et al., 2011), as we previously
discussed.
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We will now discuss the other contrasts evaluated in our study.
As we have previously said, the results for the ‘navigation >
photographs’ contrast showed the activation of the cuneus and
the parietal lobe, two of the most important results obtained in
the ‘navigation > video’contrast, which we have highlighted as
having been previously related to presence during the navigation
task. Moreover, the activation of the cuneus may reflect an
increase in the visual processing due to the change in the optical
flow between both conditions. We have also found activations
in the cerebellum and the frontal lobe, results that coincide
with those obtained by Pine et al. (2002), who also evaluated
differences between free and guided navigation. The cerebellum
may have been activated because of its role in the control of
movement (Willshaw, 1999; Wolf et al., 2009). The frontal lobe
is related to the planning of the navigation task (Baumgartner
et al., 2006; Owen et al., 1990). It is also important to remark
that the cuneus, precuneus, middle occipital lobe and frontal
lobes are areas which were also activated in the research by
Baumgartner et al. (2008).
Regarding the ‘video > photographs’ results, there are
coincidences with the study by Pine et al. (2002) in the temporal
and frontal lobes. Our results agree only with those from
Baumgartner et al. (2008) in the middle frontal lobe, which is
often referred to as being involved in various executive functions
as, for example, the planning of movement (Baumgartner
et al., 2006; Owen et al., 1990). The fact that there are
no other coincidences between the results may be explained
by the lower sense of presence stimulated during the two
conditions (video and photographs) compared here. Moreover,
inside the temporo-occipital cluster, it is worthy to remark the
bilateral activation of the V5/MT area, part of the extrastriate
visual cortex, which plays a main role in the perception of
movement (Born and Bradley, 2005), due to the addition of
visual movement in the video condition.
With regard to the correlation analysis comparing brain
activation and responses to questionnaires, we found a negative
correlation in the prefrontal cortex, more specifically in the
dorsolateral area, which agrees with the result obtained by
Baumgartner et al. (2008) for the measurement of presence in
video tasks, although at an inferior location within the DLPFC.
This area is related to executive processing within working
memory (Petrides, 2000) and controls the visual information
that comes from the visualization of the VE, being involved in
the decrease of the sense of presence (Koechlin et al., 2003).
Moreover, Jäncke et al. (2009) also remarked its importance in
modulating and generating the activity of the network associated
with the experience of presence. Regarding the positive
correlations, we obtained significant activations in the lingual
gyrus, cerebellum; middle, sub-gyral and superior temporal
lobe; calcarine and cuneus.All of these areas are related to sense
of presence, which explains why their activation gets higher
along with the increase of the questionnaires scores. Particularly
remarkable is the result for the lingual parahippocampal gyrus,
more specifically the activation of the parahippocampal area,
a sub-region of the parahippocampal cortex related to spatial
orientation and encoding and recognition of scenes (Aguirre
et al., 1996; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998).
Referring to the parametric analysis, it showed a lineal trend
between the three tasks associated with an increased feeling
of presence in the insula and parietal lobe, two of the most
significant areas we emphasized for the ‘navigation > video’
contrast, and which are related to self-awareness (Craig, 2009;
Karnath et al., 2005) and navigation sense in a VE (Johnson
et al., 1996; Mishkin and Ungerleider, 1982), respectively.
The fact that these two areas showed a positive correlation
with questionnaire scores, and in the parametric analysis, is
an indicator of their relation to sense of presence.
To finish this discussion, we will address some of the
limitations of our study. The study was conducted using a
specific group of participants, namely 14 right-handed women.
They were all right-handed to prevent noise effects of manual
lateralization on brain activation in virtual/spatial processing.
The subjects were all women to reduce variability generated
by gender differences. There are some previous studies which
show that women present a higher activation in the presence
of emotional stimuli than men. In fact, Canli et al. (2001)
indicated that they chose women because they respond more
intensely to sensitive stimuli. They also maintained that women
show a greater psychological reaction according to their value
judgment than men. Some other studies concerning emotional
arousal have also concluded that women demonstrate higher
activation when shown disgusting images than when shown
pleasant ones, while men do not demonstrate any difference
(Lang et al., 1998). A great deal of previous studies concerning
visual stimuli has been conducted with women (e.g., Dilger
et al., 2003; Ochsner et al., 2002). Another limitation of our
study was the small sample size, which restricts the statistical
power to detect changes in the BOLD signal.
In our study, we added the continuous movement of the
joystick to compensate the differences between experimental
conditions in the activations caused by the motor tasks.
However, there were differences in the active planning between
the free navigation condition and the other two tasks, and these
differences could not be prevented because they are one of the
causes of the differences in the feeling of presence between
experimental conditions. We should also remark as a limitation
the low significance level we used for the statistical analysis
of the fMRI data (p < 0.001 (uncorrected) may be a liberal
threshold). Maybe the use of a 3 T scanner could improve the
results obtained here.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the activation of the cuneus, the insula and the
parietal areas should be noted, especially the latter, due to its
relationship with the navigational aspects of the VR experience.
As shown in Section 4, our final results are consistent with those
Interacting with Computers, Vol. 26 No. 3, 2014
 at O
U
P site access on A
pril 2, 2015
http://iw
c.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
282 Miriam Clemente et al.
from other studies concerning navigation in VR, presence in
VR studied with other brain imaging techniques and presence
during an automatic navigation in a VE studied with fMRI.
Moreover, insula activation inVR and its parametric association
with the sense of presence experienced in each of the conditions
raises questions regarding its role in the virtual experience.
However, the brain activation results may be seen just as a
proof of the utility of fMRI as a tool to evaluate presence, and
the important consequences that this could have in the field of
the HCI. Although in this study we have generated differences
in presence with changing navigation conditions, possible
future research could involve more arousing environments,
with different content, to analyze other factors that can induce
presence. Moreover, the demonstration that presence is related
to measurable differences in brain activity, even inside an
unfriendly environment as it is an MR machine, opens the door
to future studies combining VR with fMRI for psychological
treatments and psychopathological applications.
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